Plainfield Trash Facts

The facts on the proposed trash plant
Plainfield, Connecticut

How other towns won

How Connecticut Towns Turned Back Plants Like This

Connecticut has stopped large energy and waste facilities before, but not by a town vote. A fully certified 650 megawatt gas plant in Killingly was never built after federal regulators terminated its capacity contract for missed deadlines,5 and Hartford’s MIRA trash incinerator closed after the state refused a subsidy of more than $330 million.6 The pattern across the record is two pressure points: no demonstrated public need, and no public money.

The proposed SMART gasification plant in Plainfield remains a proposal under active review by state agencies; no final permit decision has been issued.911 Residents fairly ask whether a facility like this has ever actually been turned back in Connecticut. The documented answer is yes, more than once, though never by referendum and never with a facility identical to this one. Below are four Connecticut cases, each anchored to the primary state, federal, or court record, with the transferable lesson from each.

Case one

Killingly: a certified gas plant that was never built

The Killingly Energy Center is the clearest Connecticut example that even a state-certified project can fail. NTE Connecticut, LLC, a subsidiary of a Florida developer, proposed a gas-fired power plant on Lake Road in the Dayville section of Killingly.

On May 11, 2017 the Connecticut Siting Council denied NTE’s first application, for a 550 megawatt plant, without prejudice.124 The reason was decisive and specific: following the results of ISO New England’s Forward Capacity Auction, the grid operator had determined the project was not needed for regional resource adequacy, so NTE had not demonstrated the public need the Council must find.1 Public need is the hinge of the Siting Council’s balancing test under Connecticut law; without it, there was no public benefit to weigh against the plant’s impacts.12

NTE later secured an ISO New England capacity commitment and moved to reopen the case on changed conditions. On June 6, 2019 the Council granted a certificate for a larger 650 megawatt version.2 The vote was 4 in favor and 1 opposed, with one member absent, on a Council that then had only six of its nine seats filled.1314 The project was now certified.

It still was never built. A grassroots group, Not Another Power Plant, together with the Sierra Club, the Connecticut Fund for the Environment / Save the Sound, and the Wyndham Land Trust, obtained formal party and intervenor status in the docket, which allowed them to cross-examine witnesses, file testimony, and appeal.3 Their appeal was ultimately dismissed by the Connecticut Supreme Court on September 28, 2021, which held, over a dissent, that the Council was not required to review the environmental impact of the future gas pipeline that would feed the plant.4 The appeal lost, but it consumed years of the developer’s time.

What actually ended the plant was a missed federal deadline. On January 3, 2022 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission accepted ISO New England’s request to terminate NTE’s Capacity Supply Obligation, after the grid operator lost confidence the plant would reach commercial operation by its June 1, 2024 milestone; FERC denied NTE’s request for a stay on January 28, 2022.51516 Without that guaranteed revenue stream, the project’s financing collapsed. The plant was never built, and NTE Energy has since dissolved.17

The transferable lesson: sustained, multi-year opposition does not have to win an outright permit denial. By contesting a case at every step, opponents can extend the timeline until a developer misses a binding financial or construction deadline.5

Case two

MIRA Hartford: stopping the money, not the permit

The MIRA incinerator in Hartford’s South Meadows had burned municipal trash since 1988 for dozens of Connecticut towns. It was not defeated in a permit fight. It closed because the economics failed and the state declined to prop it up.

By 2020, MIRA was seeking more than $330 million in state support to rebuild an aging, money-losing plant. On July 14, 2020 the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection rejected the request.625 Governor Ned Lamont stated: “I cannot support sending hundreds of millions of state taxpayer or electric ratepayer dollars to MIRA to attempt to keep a failing decades-old facility running, right here in Hartford where it impacts our vulnerable residents.”6 DEEP Commissioner Katie Dykes asked the MIRA board to deliver “a real plan, fully exploring all of the options,” rather than the subsidy.6

Once the subsidy was off the table, the facility’s member towns did the rest. In April 2022, 26 member towns moved to leave the MIRA collaborative, the largest single exodus in the agency’s history, driven by tipping fees that towns found higher than private-sector alternatives.1920 Combustion at the plant ended at 1:56 a.m. on July 19, 2022.1820

The transferable lesson: attacking a project’s finances, its subsidies, tax deals, and public support, can be as powerful as opposing a permit. Public officials will decline to fund a project the public clearly opposes.6

Case three

Putnam: local boards are a separate decision point

State agencies are not the only bodies with a say. In neighboring Putnam, when Wheelabrator sought to expand its ash landfill beside the Quinebaug River, the local Inland Wetlands Commission voted 2 to 1 against the expansion in October 2019, dismissing the application without prejudice for want of complete information on how it would mitigate wetland impacts.2122 That was an independent local decision, separate from the state review.

To be honest about the record, that local vote did not end the project. The proposal continued through the state process, and in a Proposed Final Decision the DEEP Office of Adjudications hearing officer recommended that the Commissioner grant the state permits.7 The point is not that Putnam “won,” but that a town’s own wetlands and zoning boards are a distinct hurdle a developer must clear on its own, generating additional hearings, delay, and a public record even where the state is inclined to approve.

For Plainfield this matters because, on the state regulatory record, the SMART developer has stated it will also need town building, stormwater, and wastewater permits, each handled locally, in addition to the state reviews.109

Case four, the counter-example

Towantic: why “no public need” is the sharpest tool

Not every fight is won, and the losses are as instructive as the wins. In Oxford, residents opposed the CPV Towantic gas plant. The Connecticut Siting Council approved it on May 14, 2015, a 785 megawatt facility that began operating in 2018.8

The difference from Killingly’s first round was the need question. Towantic’s 2015 approval was not a fresh public-need finding at all; it was a modification of a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need the Council had already granted for the site in 1999.8 With need already established and the applicant standing in the ISO New England forward capacity market, the Council’s balancing test is deferential to the developer.8 That is the mirror image of Killingly in 2017, where the absence of a demonstrated need produced an outright denial.1

The transferable lesson: the single strongest legal argument against a facility like this is that the state has not shown it is actually needed. Where need is already proven, opposition faces a much steeper climb.

At a glance

Four cases, four outcomes

These were not identical facilities to the Plainfield proposal. They ranged from gas-fired power plants to a mass-burn incinerator to an ash landfill. The mechanisms that decided them, however, travel across facility types.

Four Connecticut facilities, their outcomes, and the decisive mechanism in each. Sources in the notes below.
Project Type Outcome Decisive mechanism
Killingly Energy Center 650 MW gas plant Certified 2019, never built17 Federal capacity contract terminated for a missed deadline5
MIRA Hartford Trash incinerator Closed July 202218 Economics; state refused a $330M-plus subsidy6
Wheelabrator Putnam Ash landfill expansion Denied locally 2 to 121 Local wetlands board acting independently of the state21
CPV Towantic 785 MW gas plant Approved and built8 Public need already established; opposition lost8

These four outcomes turn on Connecticut’s own permitting and funding record. One further point reinforces the MIRA lesson: the specific technology proposed for Plainfield, commercial waste gasification, has a documented pattern of collapsing on its own economics elsewhere, entirely apart from any permit fight. Air Products walked away from two plasma-gasification plants at Tees Valley in England in 2016 after a pre-tax charge of roughly $900 million to $1 billion.26 Enerkem’s waste-to-ethanol plant in Edmonton, billed as the world’s first commercial-scale facility of its kind, shut down in early 2024, eleven years into a 25-year lease, having produced only a small fraction of its annual target output.27 Plasco spent about $400 million on its Ottawa gasification demonstration plant before filing for creditor protection in 2015; the plant was dismantled and its intellectual property bought back for $1.28 The through-line is the same one that ended MIRA: when the money fails, the plant stops. The fuller record of these commercial and financial failures is on the Defeated Projects page.

What this means for Plainfield

What Plainfield can honestly take from this

  • These were different facility types than the proposed Plainfield gasification plant. The lessons are about process and pressure points, not a promise of the same result.
  • None of these projects was stopped by a town referendum. Plainfield’s 1,148–125 vote in June 2025 was non-binding; the state, not the town, holds the permitting decision.23
  • The sharpest legal argument is no demonstrated public need. Its absence produced Killingly’s 2017 denial; its prior existence let Towantic through.18
  • Delay is a real form of pressure. Contesting a case at every step can outlast a developer’s financing and deadlines, as at Killingly.5
  • Follow the money. Opposing subsidies, tax deals, and public support can end a project the way MIRA ended, without any permit denial.6
  • Local boards count. Town wetlands and zoning bodies are separate decision points with their own hearings and record.21

Questions and answers

Common questions

Has a plant like the one proposed in Plainfield ever been stopped in Connecticut?

Yes, though not an identical facility and never by referendum. A certified 650 megawatt gas plant in Killingly was never built, and Hartford’s MIRA trash incinerator closed in 2022.1718

How was the Killingly power plant stopped?

The Siting Council certified it in 2019, but on January 3, 2022 federal regulators terminated its ISO New England capacity contract after the developer would not meet its June 1, 2024 commercial-operation milestone. Without guaranteed revenue the financing collapsed and the plant was never built.517

Why did the MIRA Hartford incinerator close?

On economics. On July 14, 2020 the state rejected more than $330 million in requested subsidies, and in April 2022 twenty-six member towns moved to leave over rising fees. Combustion ended on July 19, 2022.619

Did any Connecticut town stop one of these plants by referendum?

No. None of these outcomes came from a town vote. Plainfield’s referendum was non-binding, because Connecticut’s permitting authority rests with the state.23

What is the strongest argument against a plant like this?

That the state has not shown the facility is actually needed. The absence of a demonstrated public need produced Killingly’s 2017 denial; where need was already established, as at Towantic, opponents lost.18

See how to be heard →  ·  Where the Plainfield proposal stands →

Sources

Where These Facts Come From

Load-bearing facts are anchored to the highest-tier record available: Connecticut Siting Council dockets and decisions, a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission order, a Connecticut Supreme Court opinion, Connecticut DEEP records, and the SMART developer’s own filings on the state regulatory record. Sources are grouped official and regulatory first, then scientific and technical, with news coverage listed last as corroboration only.

Official & regulatory sources

  1. Connecticut Siting Council, Docket No. 470, Findings of Fact and Decision (May 11, 2017): the Council denied NTE’s 550 MW application without prejudice for failure to demonstrate public need, ISO New England’s Forward Capacity Auction having shown the project was not needed for resource adequacy. portal.ct.gov/CSC (PDF). Docket record: Docket No. 470.
  2. Connecticut Siting Council, Docket No. 470B, Findings of Fact and Decision (June 6, 2019): the Council granted a certificate for the modified 650 MW facility, the turbine change increasing output from 550 MW to 650 MW. portal.ct.gov/CSC (PDF).
  3. Connecticut Siting Council, Docket No. 470 service list: documents party and intervenor status held by Not Another Power Plant, the Sierra Club, the Connecticut Fund for the Environment / Save the Sound, and the Wyndham Land Trust. portal.ct.gov/CSC (PDF).
  4. Connecticut Supreme Court, Not Another Power Plant v. Connecticut Siting Council, No. SC20464 (officially released September 28, 2021): affirmed the dismissal of the opponents’ administrative appeal, holding, over a dissent, that the Council was not required to consider the environmental impact of the future connecting gas pipeline. jud.ct.gov (official slip opinion, PDF).
  5. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, ISO New England Inc., 178 FERC ¶ 61,063, Docket No. ER22-355-001 (Jan. 28, 2022), denying NTE’s request for a stay and recounting the Commission’s January 3, 2022 order (178 FERC ¶ 61,001) accepting ISO New England’s termination of Killingly’s Capacity Supply Obligation, the resource being unlikely to reach commercial operation by the June 1, 2024 milestone. iso-ne.com (FERC order, PDF).
  6. Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, news release, “State Rejects MIRA Plea for Hundreds of Millions in Subsidies for Hartford Waste Incinerator” (July 14, 2020): rejects more than $330 million in requested subsidies; includes Governor Lamont’s statement and Commissioner Dykes’s request for a real plan. portal.ct.gov/DEEP.
  7. Connecticut DEEP, Office of Adjudications, Wheelabrator Putnam ash-landfill expansion, Proposed Final Decision (2021): the hearing officer recommended that the Commissioner grant the requested state permits, and the record describes the ash monofill on the Quinebaug River. portal.ct.gov/DEEP (PDF).
  8. Connecticut Siting Council, Docket No. 192B, Findings of Fact and Decision (May 14, 2015): approved the 785 MW CPV Towantic facility as a modification of the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need originally granted for the Oxford site on June 23, 1999. portal.ct.gov/CSC (PDF).
  9. SMART Technology Systems, response to the CT DEEP Materials Management Infrastructure Request for Information (DEEP-hosted PDF): the developer’s own stated project figures on the state regulatory record, including the facility’s throughput, technology, and permitting needs. This is the primary source for any figure attributed to SMART; such figures are the developer’s own projections, not independent findings. portal.ct.gov/DEEP (SMART RFI response, PDF).
  10. Connecticut DEEP, Environmental Justice Public Participation Plan for SMART Technology Systems, LLC, Norwich Road / Black Hill Road, Plainfield (DEEP-hosted PDF): the developer’s official environmental-justice filing describing the proposed Plainfield facility, its location, and the state and local permits it states it will require. portal.ct.gov/DEEP (SMART EJ Public Participation Plan, PDF).
  11. Connecticut Siting Council, Applications and Other Pending Matters: the official docket of matters currently before the Council, establishing that a project of this kind proceeds through active state review and that no final Council decision on the Plainfield proposal has been issued. portal.ct.gov/CSC (Pending Matters).
  12. Connecticut General Statutes, the statutory framework governing this kind of facility: the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, ch. 277a, including the Siting Council’s certificate and public-need standard (§§16-50i, 16-50m, 16-50n, 16-50p); the solid-waste permitting statutes, ch. 446d (§§22a-208a, 22a-208d); the environmental-justice statute (§22a-20a); and the citizen-intervention statute (§22a-19). cga.ct.gov ch. 277a; ch. 446d.

Scientific & technical studies

This page’s load-bearing claims are legal and regulatory, drawn from dockets, court and agency decisions, and the developer’s filings; it makes no independent scientific or technical claim. The peer-reviewed and agency-technical evidence on emissions, ash leaching, PFAS, and gasification performance is compiled in the full evidence library.

News coverage

  1. CT Mirror, “A bad decision by a half-empty oversight board”: the Council approved the 650 MW Killingly certificate on June 6, 2019 on a 4–1 vote with an understaffed board. ctmirror.org.
  2. Hartford Business Journal, “Killingly power plant wins Siting Council approval”: reports the 650 MW approval on a vote of four in favor, one opposed, one absent. hartfordbusiness.com.
  3. Utility Dive, “FERC approves ISO-NE’s request to strip proposed Connecticut gas-fired power plant of capacity contract” (January 2022). utilitydive.com.
  4. CT Mirror, “Proposed Killingly power plant dealt another blow” (FERC removed Killingly from the capacity market in January 2022 after NTE missed required deadlines). ctmirror.org.
  5. Renewable Energy World, “Legal snafu over canceled natural gas plant site…”: the Killingly plant “was never built, and NTE Energy has since dissolved” and no longer holds an option on the property. renewableenergyworld.com.
  6. Connecticut Public, “After months of debate, Hartford trash-burning plant now officially closed” (combustion ended 1:56 a.m., July 19, 2022). ctpublic.org.
  7. Connecticut Public, “26 Connecticut towns exiting MIRA trash collaborative” (April 2022; the largest one-time exodus in the agency’s history, over tipping fees higher than private-sector rates). ctpublic.org.
  8. Waste Dive, “Connecticut’s MIRA WTE facility finally closes, leaving many questions about regional capacity” (July 2022 closure and member-town departures). wastedive.com.
  9. Waste Dive, “Wheelabrator ash landfill expansion in Connecticut denied, for now”: the Putnam Inland Wetlands Commission voted 2–1 against the expansion in October 2019, dismissing it without prejudice. wastedive.com.
  10. Waste360, “Putnam, Conn., Commission Denies Wheelabrator Landfill Expansion” (2–1 denial on incomplete wetland-mitigation information). waste360.com.
  11. Hartford Courant via Government Technology, “Connecticut Residents Object to Plans for High-Tech Trash Plant” (the June 2025 Plainfield referendum, 1,148–125, was non-binding; state agencies hold permitting authority). govtech.com.
  12. Hartford Business Journal, “Killingly power plant returns to CT Siting Council”: recounts the Council’s May 2017 rejection of NTE’s original 550 MW application for want of a demonstrated need, corroborating the docket decision. hartfordbusiness.com.
  13. CT Examiner, “Lamont Rejects Plea for $330 Million of Subsidies for MIRA Waste-to-Energy Plant” (July 15, 2020): independent report corroborating the state’s rejection of the more-than-$330 million subsidy request. ctexaminer.com.
  14. The Chemical Engineer (IChemE), “Air Products quits Tees Valley gasification” (2016): the company abandoned two plasma-gasification plants, each designed for about 700,000 tonnes of waste per year, in April 2016 after a $900 million–$1 billion pre-tax charge, the second unit halted in November 2015 with roughly 700 layoffs after the first could not run reliably. thechemicalengineer.com.
  15. CBC News, “Waste-to-ethanol plant in Edmonton closes 11 years early” (2024): Enerkem’s roughly $80 million municipal-solid-waste-to-ethanol facility, plus a $40 million city-built feedstock facility, on a 25-year lease from 2010 and billed as the world’s first commercial-scale plant of its kind, closed in early 2024 after producing about 5 million litres against a 36-million-litre annual target. cbc.ca.
  16. Ottawa Business Journal, “Plasco waste-to-energy firm set to relaunch” (2018): Plasco spent about $400 million in private funding over roughly a decade on its Ottawa gasification demonstration plant, missed financing deadlines, and filed for creditor protection in early 2015; the Trail Road plant was dismantled and the intellectual property bought back for $1. obj.ca.

See the full evidence library →